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“Historically, fashion has rarely been elevated to the same stature as 
painting, music, sculpture, or architecture. But fashion is one of the purest 
expressions of art because it is art lived on a daily basis.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
 The fashion industry in the United States generates more than $350 billion in 
revenue annually2 and employs more than 1.8 million people.3 Not only does the 
industry positively impact the economy,4 but it also inspires exhibits across the globe 
that showcase the artistic ability of fashion designers.5 Despite the cultural, artistic, 
and economic benefits the fashion industry provides, the United States does not offer 
significant intellectual property protections for fashion designs.6
 The idea that authors should be encouraged to create new works, while preventing 
others from copying, profiting, reproducing, or destroying those works is at the heart 
of intellectual property protection.7 Intellectual property protections include patents, 
trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights.8 Recent efforts have attempted to use 
copyright law to protect the intellectual property of fashion designers.9 As codified 
in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, copyright law states that “Congress 
shall have power to . . . promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
1. Georges Berges, In Defense of Fashion as a True Art Form, Observer (June 20, 2017), https://observer.
com/2017/06/fashion-true-art-form.
2. Carolyn B. Maloney, The Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry, U.S. Congress Joint Econ. Comm. 
1 (Feb. 2019), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/39201d61-aec8-4458-80e8-2fe26ee8a31e/
economic-impact-of-the-fashion-industry.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 1–2.
5. Sara Tardiff, 11 Best Museum Exhibits for Alternate Fashion History, Elle Decor (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.elledecor.com/life-culture/travel/g9925490/best-museum. Such exhibits include the 
following temporary showcases: Volez, Voguez, Voyagez – Louis Vuitton (New York City), The 
Glamour and Romance of Oscar de la Renta (Houston), Christian Dior, Couturier Du Rêve (Paris), 
and Balenciaga: Shaping Fashion (London). Id. 
6. See Francesca Montalvo Witzburg, Protecting Fashion: A Comparative Analysis of Fashion Design Protection 
in the United States and the European Union, 107 Trademark Rep. 1131, 1149 (2017) (“In the United 
States, fashion designs may be afforded minimal protection under trademark and patent law, and 
currently only certain designs incorporated on fashion articles would be protected under copyright.”). 
For purposes of this Note, fashion design refers to the design of articles such as garments, handbags, 
and accessories.
7. See Casey E. Callahan, Fashion Frustrated: Why the Innovative Design Protection Act is a Necessary Step in 
the Right Direction, But Not Quite Enough, 7 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 195, 196 (2012).
8. Protecting Intellectual Property in the United States: A Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the 
United Kingdom, U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/f iles/
documents/UK-SME-IP-Toolkit_FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
9. See generally Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
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writings and discoveries.”10 Copyright law is intended to promote the growth of 
creative trades11 and protect works such as books, paintings, movies, music, and 
software.12 However, the creativity embodied in fashion design is not encompassed 
in those protections.13
 This Note contends that new legislation should be adopted to protect fashion 
designs because the current intellectual property laws do not afford sufficient 
protection. Part II of this Note outlines the history of copyrighting fashion designs 
and the evolution of the separability doctrine. Part III discusses the 2017 Supreme 
Court decision Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,14 the first copyright case to 
reach the Supreme Court involving fashion designs. Part IV discusses the legal and 
fashion communities’ reactions to Star Athletica, how they believe it affected the 
applicability of copyright law to fashion designs, and why these beliefs are misplaced. 
Part V explores how fashion designs do not fit within the current intellectual 
property regime and why these designs deserve intellectual property protection. Part 
VI proposes that Congress should adopt new legislation to properly protect fashion 
designs, and concludes this Note.
II. THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHTING FASHION DESIGNS
 Copyright law protects “original works of authorship, fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”15 To be original, the work must be “independently created by 
the author (as opposed to copied from other works)” and possess “at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”16 Generally, clothes are not copyrightable due to their 
intrinsic utilitarian function.17 Although clothing designs likely possess the degree of 
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Christiane Schuman Campbell, Protecting Fashion Designs Through IP Law, Duane Morris (Apr. 14, 
2015), https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/protecting_fashion_designs_through_ip_law_5516.html.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2020); Copyright Basics, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison Libr., https://www.
library.wisc.edu/about/scholarly-communication/copyright/copyright-basics (last visited Mar. 31, 
2020). Copyright law is intended to give individuals an incentive to create and share. See What Is 
Copyright Law, Who Created It, And Why Do People Think We Need it?, New Media Rts. (June 28, 
2017), https://www.newmediarights.org/business_models/artist/what_copyright_law_who_created_
it_and_why_do_people_think_we_need_it. “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a 
fair return for an author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (citation omitted).
13. See Callahan, supra note 7, at 195–96.
14. 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
16. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1 Melville B. Nimmer & 
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §§ 2.01(A), (B) (1990)).
17. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1748 (2006) (“Fashion firms and designers in the United States have 
neither obtained expanded copyright protection applicable to apparel designs nor sui generis statutory 
protection.”).
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creativity necessary to meet the originality standard for copyright protection, clothing 
is inherently useful and copyright protection does not per se extend to useful items.18 
A “useful article” is defined in the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) as “an 
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of an article or to convey information.”19
 Although useful articles are not themselves copyrightable, the Copyright Act 
allows the “design of a useful article” to be copyrighted “if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”20 This separability requirement was set forth in 1954 by the 
Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein.21
 In Mazer, the Court held that statuettes used as bases for table lamps, with 
electric wiring sockets and lamp shades attached to them, were copyrightable despite 
their utilitarian function.22 The Court stated: “Respondents may not exclude others 
from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of 
copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article.”23 The 
Court reasoned that the intended use of the article did not limit its copyright 
protection.24 In essence, the Court ensured that an otherwise copyrightable article 
would not be denied copyright protection just because it was part of a useful article.25
 The Court in Mazer introduced the notion of “works of applied art,” which are 
described as “encompass[ing] all original, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that 
are intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles[.]”26 After Mazer, various 
courts found, inter alia, dress designs, scarf designs, plate designs, and Christmas 
18. See id. “A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray 
the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful 
article is considered a ‘useful article.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In addition to clothing, examples of “useful 
articles” include cars, lamps, sinks, and computer monitors. Works Unprotected by Copyright Law, 
BitLaw, https://www.bitlaw.com/copyright/unprotected.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 extended copyright protection to all works 
as soon as they were fixed in a tangible means of expression. Previously, works were not properly protected 
unless registered with the Copyright Office. Geoffrey P. Hull, Copyright Act of 1976, Free Speech Ctr. 
at Middle Tenn. Univ., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1072/copyright-act-of-1976 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2020). The Act also included new protections for parodies under the fair use 
doctrine. Id.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. See generally 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
22. Id. at 218 –19.
23. Id. at 218.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2A.08(B)(1)(a) (Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc., rev. ed. 2019).
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decorations protectable under the Copyright Act.27 In 1979, the Copyright Office 
attempted to incorporate the Mazer decision with the following regulation:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article 
is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, 
if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic 
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified 
separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such 
features will be eligible for registration.28
 After Mazer, courts have held that designs on garments are copyrightable. For 
example, in the 1980 case Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a decorative belt buckle was eligible for copyright 
protection.29 In 1995 the Second Circuit held, in Knitwaves v. Lollytogs, that a motif 
comprised of leaves, squirrels, and acorns on a children’s sweater was infringed because 
“[a]n observer viewing the [two] sweaters side by side cannot help but perceive them as 
coming from one creative source.”30 And in the 2005 case, Chosun International, Inc. v. 
Chrisha Creations, Ltd., the Second Circuit held that Halloween costumes may be 
copyrighted, reasoning that certain aspects of the designs may “invoke in the viewer a 
concept separate from that of the costume’s clothing function.”31
 David Nimmer, a law professor widely recognized as an expert on copyright law 
and the author of the leading treatise Nimmer on Copyright,32 explains how courts 
determine copyright eligibility by making a distinction between fabric designs and 
27. See id. (“Applying . . . Mazer, courts held protectible under the 1909 Act artistic jewelry, designs imprinted 
upon scarves and dress fabrics, dinnerware patterns, dolls, Christmas decorations, banks in the shape of 
dogs, and artistic jewelry boxes.”); see also Fisher-Price Toys, Div. of the Quaker Oats Co. v. MY-TOY 
Co., 385 F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting an injunction to permanently enjoin defendants 
from infringing plaintiff ’s copyrighted doll designs); Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 
204 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (“Royalty copyrights for its Boxer and Cocker Spaniel dog toy 
banks are valid . . . it has made out a prima facie case of infringement of such copyrights by Thrifticheck.”); 
Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (granting a 
preliminary injunction to restrain the sale of defendant’s dinnerware that infringed plaintiff ’s copyrighted 
ornamental design); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) 
(holding that plaintiff ’s fabric design was copyrightable subject matter); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United 
Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (stating that the silk screen painting 
applied in the manufacture of ladies’ blouses was “[c]learly . . . a proper subject of copyright”); Trifari, 
Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that 
plaintiff ’s expression of a hansom cab, embodied in a pin, was copyrightable).
28. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1972). This language is seen in §§ 101 and 113 of the current Copyright Act. 17 
U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012) (“[T]he exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work in copies under section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, 
whether useful or otherwise.”).
29. 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995).
31. 413 F.3d 324, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
32. Nimmer, supra note 26, at § 2A.08(H)(1).
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dress designs.33 Nimmer defines fabric designs as “the design printed on a fabric” and 
dress designs as “the design that graphically sets forth the shape, style, cut and 
dimensions for converting fabric into a finished dress or other clothing garment.”34 
After the Court’s decision in Mazer, fabric designs are copyrightable because the 
design on a dress can be separated from its utilitarian feature, the actual dress.35 In 
the 1959 case Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., the Southern District of 
New York held that a design printed on dress fabric was copyrightable subject matter 
as both a work of art and as an independent print.36 Essentially, if a design is 
“pictorial,” it makes no difference in terms of copyright protection if that design is 
printed on canvas or fabric.37
 In 1997, the Southern District of New York, in Eve of Milady v. Impression Bridal, 
expanded copyright protection of fabric designs to include lace designs.38 The court 
rejected the idea that lace designs are not copyrightable because they are part of the 
actual garment.39 After concluding that lace designs were a type of fabric design and 
not a dress design, the court found that the lace designs at issue were copyrightable 
subject matter.40
III. STAR ATHLETICA V. VARSITY BRANDS
 In response to Mazer and subsequent legislation, many tests were constructed by 
various district and circuit courts to determine whether a design aspect of a useful 
article was separable from the article itself.41 In 2017, to streamline these tests and 
discard the ambiguity surrounding the standard, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., which involved a copyright 
infringement dispute over the design on cheerleading uniforms.42 The case’s main 
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see also Nimmer, supra note 26, § 2A.08(H)(2) (“Under an 
earlier view, fabric designs were not regarded as copyrightable. By reason of Mazer v. Stein, however, 
these designs are subject to copyright protection.”).
36. 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
37. See id. (“[P]laintiffs’ design is a proper subject of copyright both as a work of art and as a print. It was 
described in the application for copyright as a work of art but that does not preclude sustaining its 
copyrightability on the ground that it is a print.”); see also Guillermo Jimenez & Barbara Kolsun, 
Fashion Law Cases and Materials 61 (2016) (“If the designs are ‘pictorial,’ as the court appears to 
accept, then it does not matter whether they are printed on paper or on fabrics.”).
38. 957 F. Supp 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that lace designs are copyrightable because they are 
fabric designs). Lace is “an openwork usually figured fabric made of thread or yarn and used for 
trimmings, household coverings, and entire garments.” Lace, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lace (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
39. Eve of Milady, 957 F. Supp. at 489.
40. See id.; Jimenez, supra note 37, at 65.
41. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
42. Id. at 1004.
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issue was whether the arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes on 
Varsity’s cheerleading uniforms could be granted copyright protection as “separable 
features of the design of those cheerleading uniforms.”43 Addressing this issue with a 
two-prong test, the Court stated that, “[w]hether a feature incorporated into a useful 
article ‘can be identified separately from,’ and is ‘capable of existing independently 
of,’ the article’s ‘utilitarian aspects’ is a matter of ‘statutory interpretation.’”44
 The Court reasoned that the first requirement of the two-prong test—whether 
the design could be identified separately—only requires the decisionmaker to “be 
able to look at the useful article and spot some two or three-dimensional element 
that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”45 The second 
requirement—whether the design could exist independently—requires the 
decisionmaker to “determine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to 
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.”46 If the feature cannot exist on 
its own as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, it is a utilitarian feature of the 
article and not eligible for copyright protection.47
 Next, the Court looked at Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act which grants the 
owner of the copyright “exclusive rights” to “reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies.”48 This right of reproduction, as outlined in Section 113(a) of the Copyright 
Act, “includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether 
useful or otherwise.”49 The Court concluded that Sections 106 and 113 “make clear 
that copyright protection extends to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works regardless 
of whether they were created as freestanding art or as features of useful articles.”50 
Consistent with Mazer and the subsequent regulations, the Court then articulated the 
following rule: “A feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright if, 
when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it would qualify as a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in some other 
tangible medium.”51
 The Court held that the decorative design on the cheerleading uniforms satisfied 
the two-prong test and was therefore eligible for copyright protection. The design 
was separable because: (1) the design had pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities; 
43. Id. at 1008–09.
44. Id. at 1005 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
45. Id. at 1010.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Court further explained that a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work cannot itself be a useful 
article or “[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful article.” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101); see also 
Useful Article, U.S. Copyright Off., https://www.copyright.gov/register/va-useful.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2020) (“An article that is normally part of a useful article may itself be a useful article, for 
example, an ornamental wheel cover on a vehicle.”).
48. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012)).
49. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012)).
50. Id. at 1011.
51. Id. at 1012.
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(2) the arrangement of the different aspects of the design (the chevrons, colors, 
stripes, and shapes) could be separated, “applied in another medium,” and “qualify as 
‘two-dimensional . . . works of . . . art,’” and (3) conceptually removing the decorative 
design and placing it in a different medium “would not replicate the uniform itself.”52
 The Court rejected the argument that the decorative designs were not separable 
from the cheerleading uniform because the designs still depicted the outline of the 
uniform once extracted from it.53 Instead, the Court noted that a two-dimensional 
design can conform to its medium while remaining its own individual design and not 
taking on the shape of the medium as part of the design itself.54 Further, the Court 
rejected the idea that once the decorative design was removed, the uniform would no 
longer be functional stating that “[t]he focus of the separability inquiry is on the 
extracted feature and not on any aspects of the useful article that remain after the 
imaginary extraction.”55 Essentially, the useful article need not remain after the 
design in issue is separated from that article. Physical separability is when a feature 
can “be physically separated from the article by ordinary means while leaving the 
utilitarian aspects of the article completely intact.”56 Conceptual separability, on the 
other hand, is when the feature would not be able to be removed “from the useful 
article by ordinary means,” but is still nonetheless separable.57 Ultimately, the Court 
rejected the physical-conceptual distinction in the separability analysis, leaving only 
the test of conceptual separability.58 However, after Star Athletica, this distinction is 
no longer necessary.
 Notably, the Court stated that only the two-dimensional decorative design was 
eligible for copyright protection and that even if a valid copyright was found, the 
copyright owner would “have no right to prohibit any person from manufacturing a 
cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and dimensions” and “only the 
reproduction of the surface designs in any tangible medium of expression” could be 
prohibited.59
IV. THE RESPONSE TO STAR ATHLETICA
 “A figurative celebratory cry was heard around the fashion world the day this 
opinion was published.”60 Star Athletica was the first copyright case in which the 
52. Id.
53. Id. Petitioner argued, and the dissent agreed, that the decorative designs were not separable from the 
cheerleading uniform because the designs still depicted the outline of the uniform after their removal. Id.
54. See id. at 1012–13.
55. Id. at 1013.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1014.
59. Id. at 1013.
60. Jennifer Carter, Fast Fashion May Be on Fast Decline After Star Athletica Ruling, Juris Mag. (Nov. 5, 2017), 
http://sites.law.duq.edu/juris/2017/11/05/fast-fashion-may-be-on-fast-decline-after-star-athletica-ruling.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari for a garment.61 For this reason, many fashion 
companies, designers, and advocates view the case as a landmark decision that 
changed the way fashion designs could be protected through copyright law.62 This 
seemed like a win to the fashion community because the fashion designer prevailed.63 
Commentators point to three different aspects of the Star Athletica decision when 
discussing its positive impact on the copyrightability of fashion designs. The decision, 
however, merely maintained the status quo of copyright law.64
 A. The Star Athletica Decision Does Not Offer New Protection for Fashion Designs
 First, critics were thrilled with the decision because the Supreme Court rejected 
the idea of a physical-conceptual distinction, stating it was unnecessary.65 The Court 
did indeed state that the separation analysis should focus on the extracted article and 
not on the aspects of the useful article that remain after the separation.66 However, 
with this conclusion the Court did nothing more than reiterate the holding in Mazer.67 
In Mazer, the statuettes were only conceptually separable because they were the actual 
bases of the lamps.68 A physical separation would have left the lamp as a non-
61. Kali Hayes, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands Copyright Suit: A Fashion Primer, WWD (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://wwd.com/business-news/legal/cheerleader-uniform-supreme-court-case-10817470/.
62. See Francisco Javier Careaga Franco, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands: Supreme Court Issues Landmark 
Ruling on Fashion and Design Copyright, Jolt Dig. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/
supreme-court-issues-landmark-ruling-on-fashion-and-design-copyright (“This [decision] opens a door 
for designers to apply for inexpensive copyright protections[,]” and “[m]ay be especially disruptive for 
the fashion and apparel industry . . . that work with fast and not-lasting trends[.]”).
63. See generally Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1002.
64. Id. at 1016.
65. See Andrea L. Calvaruso, V-I-C-T-O-R-Y for the Fashion Industry: SCOTUS Establishes Uniform Test for 
Protection of Artistic Works Applied to Apparel, Ad L. Access (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.adlawaccess.
com/2017/03/articles/v-i-c-t-o-r-y-for-the-fashion-industry-scotus-establishes-uniform-test-for- 
protection-of-artistic-works-applied-to-apparel (“The Court’s decision also confirmed that copyright 
protection for pictorial, graphic and sculptural features applied to useful articles such as apparel and 
other fashion items is alive and well.”).
66. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013.
67. See id. at 1013–14.
[B]ecause the removed feature may not be a useful article—as it would then not qualify 
as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—there necessarily would be some aspects of 
the original useful article “left behind” if the feature were conceptually removed. But 
the statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning useful 
article at all, much less an equally useful one. Indeed, such a requirement would deprive 
the Mazer statuette of protection had it been created first as a lamp base rather than as 
a statuette. Without the base, the “lamp” would be just a shade, bulb, and wires. The 
statute does not require that we imagine a nonartistic replacement for the removed 
feature to determine whether that feature is capable of an independent existence.
 Id.
68. Nimmer, supra note 26, at § 2A.08(B)(3).
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functional item.69 Star Athletica ensured that an otherwise copyrightable decorative 
design that is part of a useful article will not lose its copyright eligibility merely 
because it was first placed on that useful article and not on some other medium of 
expression, such as a canvas or piece of paper.70 In essence, the conceptual separability 
analysis was left unchanged.71 The abandonment of the physical separability test 
allows a design element to be copyrightable subject matter even if the “underlying 
useful article” does not remain a “fully functioning useful article” after the separation.72
 The second reason Star Athletica was seen as a landmark decision was because the 
Court rejected the idea that design purposes and methods should be considered 
when determining whether a decorative design is eligible for copyright protection.73 
This, again, did nothing more than restate common copyright practices. In 1903, the 
Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. stated the danger of “persons 
trained only to the law” to be the “final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations.”74 
This assertion, made by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., has been read to stand 
for the notion that judges should refrain from assessing aesthetic merit.75 Refraining 
from such judgment allows a judge to avoid the “what is art?” question.76 Star Athletica 
simply reiterated the way Bleistein, over a century ago, directed courts to be cautious 
when determining the creativity necessary for copyright eligibility.77 The statement 
made by Holmes “is the most famous and strongly articulated on the point of judicial 
restraint in aesthetic determinations.”78 Further, Mazer explicitly rejected the idea 
that the intended use of an article should limit its copyright eligibility.79 In other 
words, the artist’s intent when creating the work, and how subjectively difficult the 
69. Id.
70. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014 (discussing Mazer’s abandonment of “distinctions between purely 
aesthetic articles and useful works of art”).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1013; George Thuronyi, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Separability Analysis in its Ruling on 
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Lib. of Congress (Apr. 6, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/
copyright/2017/04/u-s-supreme-court-clarifies-separability-analysis-in-its-ruling-on-star-athletica-llc-
v-varsity-brands-inc.
73. Calvaruso, supra note 65 (“Had the Court considered [design methods, purposes, and reasons], as 
advocated by Star Athletica, it could have effectively eliminated protection for applied art for fashion 
companies that employ designers to create pictorial, graphic and sculptural works for the purpose of 
applying them to fashion products.”); see also Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1015.
74. 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
75. See Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 Ala. L. Rev. 381, 448 (2017) (“Holmes’s admonition 
has been generalized as a general principle of aesthetic neutrality in law.”).
76. Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 805, 815 (2005); see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 
(explaining the dangers of having judges be the arbiters of what is and is not art).
77. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
78. Farley, supra note 76, at 817.
79. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the 
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates 
its registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.”).
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work was to create, should not be a factor in determining copyright eligibility. This 
principle is firmly rooted in the history of copyright protection, and the Court in 
Star Athletica did little more than abide by previous precedent that warned judges 
against judging the artistic worth of art.80
 Third, scholars in the field put an emphasis on the Court’s language stating that 
the “shape, cut, and physical dimensions” of the cheerleading uniform were not 
eligible for copyright protection.81 The two-prong test laid out in Star Athletica 
seemed like a slam dunk for the fashion community in that a fabric design could be 
copyrightable if it was able to be “separated” from the clothing itself.82 However, the 
design on the cheerleading uniforms was not simply a design placed on the surface of 
the fabric.83 This suggests that, on remand, the district court could find that the 
design was actually the shape, cut, and dimension of the cheerleading uniforms.84 
Scholars in the field who focus on this language of the opinion argue that the 
cheerleading uniforms at issue were actually uncopyrightable dress designs.85
 B. An Uncopyrightable Dress Design Versus a Copyrightable Fabric Design
 Cheerleading uniforms are made up of cut-and-sew garments.86 Each part of the 
chevron and stripe pattern at issue in Star Athletica was cut from individual pieces of 
various colored material and sewn together to create the decorative design seen on 
80. See Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 193 (2002) 
(stating that “the Bleistein Court provided the conceptual structure underlying an exceedingly low 
originality standard”).
81. Telephone Interview with Steven M. Crosby, Feldman Law Group (Oct. 5, 2018). Crosby represented 
Star Athletica in Star Athletica, LLC. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017).
To be clear, the only feature of the cheerleading uniform eligible for a copyright in this 
case is the two-dimensional work of art fixed in the tangible medium of the uniform 
fabric. Even if respondents ultimately succeed in establishing a valid copyright in the 
surface decorations at issue here, respondents have no right to prohibit any person from 
manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and dimensions to the ones 
on which the decorations in this case appear. They may prohibit only the reproduction of 
the surface designs in any tangible medium of expression—a uniform or otherwise.
 Id. at 1013.
82. See Carter, supra note 60 (“In the recent Supreme Court decision Star Athletica, apparel designers saw a 
monumental change in the protection that clothing could receive under copyright laws.”).
83. Steven M. Crosby, Address at the New York Law School Fashion Law Symposium: What is Real? 
Authenticity, Transparency, and Trust in the Digital Age of Fashion (Feb. 7, 2019). Crosby was a keynote 
speaker at the New York Law School Fashion Law Symposium who spoke about his experience as lead 
counsel in the Star Athletica case. Fashion Law: What is Real? Authenticity, Transparency, and Trust in the 
Digital Age of Fashion, N.Y.L Sch. L. Rev., https://www.nyls.edu/innovation-center-for-law-and-
technology/icltevents/fashion-law-symposium/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
84. Crosby, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Id. The cheerleading uniforms at issue in Star Athletica were made up of multiple components. 
Specifically, the zigzag pattern that follows the bottom hem of the top portion of the uniform was made 
up of multiple pieces of colored fabric sewn together to create a striped effect. Id.
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the uniforms.87 Since the pattern is created this way, a cheerleading uniform is 
constructed with, or composed of, its design.88 This gives rise to the question of 
whether the design of a cheerleading uniform is actually the “shape, cut, and 
dimension” of the garment, making the cheerleading uniform an uncopyrightable 
dress design instead of a copyrightable fabric design. In other words, the issue is 
whether the design is one that “graphically sets forth the shape, style, cut, and 
dimensions” of the garment89 or one where “the design [is] imprinted on a fabric.”90
 If the design is interpreted to be the “shape, cut, and dimension” of the garment, 
the cheerleading uniform in Star Athletica would be an uncopyrightable dress design. 
The strips of fabric are cut and sewn together to create the pattern of the uniform, 
regardless of the fact that these strips of fabric also combine to create the chevron 
and zigzag patterns of the cheerleading uniforms. This combination of fabric strips is 
part of a useful article that cannot “be identified separately from” and is not “capable 
of existing independently” of the cheerleading uniform.91 
 In addition, cheerleading uniforms are designed to be useful. They allow 
cheerleaders to move, dance, jump, and flip without hindrance.92 The way the fabric 
is sewn together affects how the fabric moves when a cheerleader performs. This, in 
and of itself, is a useful function of a cheerleading uniform.93 Cheerleading uniforms 
are constructed to make the best use of the garments for cheerleaders during their 
87. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 32–33, Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 
(2017) (No. 15-866) (discussing Varsity’s cut-and-sew cheerleading uniforms).
88. Crosby, supra note 83.
89. Nimmer, supra note 26, at § 2A.08(H)(1).
90. Id.
91. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012)).
92. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 87, at 16–17.
Clothing encompasses everything from a parka to a bikini, and all clothing covers at least 
some of the body. But different kinds of clothing have different intrinsic functions. . . . It 
violates [17 U.S.C. § 101] to analyze utilitarian aspects of “clothing” generically rather 
than “the article actually at issue here: cheerleading uniforms.”
 Id.
93. See Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
While such dresses plainly have a decorative function, the decorative choices, as we 
have already observed, merge with those that decide how (and how much) to cover the 
body. Thus, a jeweled bodice covers the upper torso at the same time that it draws 
attention to it; a ruched waist covers the wearer’s midsection while giving it definition; 
and a short tulle skirt conceals the wearer’s legs while giving glimpses of them. In sum, 
the aesthetic and the functional are inseparable in the prom dress at issue and, therefore, 
Jovani cannot state a plausible copyright claim.
 Id.
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performance, the physical and aesthetic aspects of the uniform as well as the 
practicality of the uniform as it pertains to cheerleading.94
 C. The Holding in Star Athletica Creates Inconsistencies 
 Although the argument that the design should be interpreted as the “shape, cut, 
and dimension” of a garment is logical on its face, it uses a hyper-technical 
interpretation of the Star Athletica holding. This creates several inconsistencies that 
pose issues for determining the copyrightability of fabric designs; this Note offers 
four below.
 First, if the holding in Star Athletica is interpreted to mean that the design is part 
of the shape, cut, and dimension of the cheerleading uniforms, the application of the 
holding does not make practical sense. If interpreted in this manner, the district 
court on remand would have found that Varsity’s cheerleading uniform design was 
uncopyrightable because the design was sewn together with pieces of colored 
fabric—a dress design—in lieu of being placed on the already existing cheerleading 
uniform. This would produce an absurd result and the policy rationale behind the 
prohibition of copyrighting a useful article would no longer make sense.95
 Consider a scenario in which there are three different cheerleading uniforms all 
seeking copyright protection. The first is Star Athletica’s uniform featuring different 
colored fabric strips that are cut and sewn together to create the pattern of the 
uniform. The second is made of two pieces of fabric, sewn together at the seams to 
create the uniform’s shape, with the chevron and zigzag patterns created by screen-
printing the design on top of the fabric. The third is made up of cut-and-sew pieces 
of fabric in the exact same manner as Star Athletica’s except that the fabric is all one 
color. The chevron and zigzag patterns are then created by dye, screen-printing, or 
other means. In terms of appearance, the three uniforms are essentially identical. 
However, under this interpretation of the Star Athletica holding, only the second and 
third designs would be copyrightable fabric designs, because the chevron and zigzag 
patterns are placed on the garment and are not part of the dress design. The first 
design would be uncopyrightable because the pattern is sewn into the garment, 
making it part of the dress design itself. This is an absurd result—all three uniforms 
look the same but one is deemed uncopyrightable simply because of its construction.
 The second inconsistency of Star Athletica’s holding is that the chevron and zigzag 
patterns are not useful. The importance of this is demonstrated in Kieselstein-Cord, 
in which the belt at issue was useful when taken as a whole, but the belt’s buckle was 
94. See Why Choose Varsity Spirit Fashion, Varsity, https://www.varsity.com/school/spirit-fashion/why-
choose-varsity (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (explaining why Varsity’s uniforms are better than its competitors).
95. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1990). “[T]he copyright 
laws are a ref lection of Congress’ desire to protect and encourage artistic creativity, while at the same 
time ensuring the wide availability of useful designs.” Id. The separability test described by Star Athletica 
incorporates these goals by allowing only the design on the uniform to be protected and not the design 
of the cheerleading uniform itself. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013.
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determined to be separable from the useful function of the belt itself.96 The decorative 
buckle did not enhance the ability of the belt to hold up pants and was not integral 
to the functionality of the belt itself.97 Varsity’s cheerleading uniforms were 
undeniably useful. At the very least, they are useful just as any other article of 
clothing is useful—to cover one’s body.98 However, the chevron and zigzag patterns 
on the cheerleading uniform, whether created during or after construction, do not 
enhance the uniform’s ability to be used. The cheerleading uniforms, with or without 
the patterns, perform the same function of covering the cheerleader’s body, as any 
other uncopyrightable article of clothing would. The addition of the chevron and 
zigzag patterns do not enhance this function. The way the fabric strips are sewn 
together denotes the fabric design of the uniform only, and the structure of the 
cheerleading uniform —the dress design—remains unchanged.
 Third, the use of fabric strips to make the chevron and zigzag design does not 
preclude the design from copyright protection. This is illustrated in Eve of Milady, 
where the court concluded that the lace designs of bridal gowns were fabric designs 
and rejected the idea that the lace was part of the dress design itself.99 The same 
argument could be made in Star Athletica, where the design was integrated into the 
fabric, as was the lace in Eve of Milady, instead of being placed on the fabric. Using 
this logic, Varsity’s cheerleading uniform would be an uncopyrightable dress design, 
but the chevron and zigzag patterns would be a copyrightable fabric design. Although 
the fabric design at issue is a cut-and-sew design, it still denotes a fabric design, just 
like the lace in Eve of Milady.
 And fourth, if the chevron and zigzag patterns on the cheerleading uniforms 
were interpreted to be an uncopyrightable dress design, there are many other items of 
clothing that would be considered mere dress designs, as well. For example, a knitted 
sweater with a design knitted directly into the fabric would be uncopyrightable. But 
if the designer first knitted a plain sweater, knitted separate adornments, and then 
attached the adornments to the sweater, it would now be a copyrightable fabric 
design, because the adornments are not part of the sweater’s structure. This outcome 
does not make any practical sense, and it would be senseless to interpret the holding 
of Star Athletica this narrowly. Courts have dealt with situations similar to this in the 
past. For example, in Knitwaves, the court determined that the sweaters at issue were 
useful articles, but the artwork on the sweaters was a copyrightable fabric design.100 
The sweater motifs in Knitwaves were treated the same as any other fabric design, 
96. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 –94 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that 
“buckles rise to the level of creative art”).
97. Id. (“We see in appellant’s belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements, as apparently have 
the buckles’ wearers who have used them as ornamentation for parts of the body other than the waist.”).
98. See Can You Copy Clothing Designs?, New Media Rts., https://www.newmediarights.org/business_
models/artist/can_you_copyright_clothing_designs (last modified Oct. 10, 2017) (discussing clothing’s 
utilitarian purpose).
99. Eve of Milady v. Impression Bridal, 957 F. Supp 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
100. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
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regardless of the fact that the motifs were incorporated into the sweater, technically 
making up the “shape, cut, and dimension” of the sweater.101 If the chevron and 
zigzag patterns on Varsity’s cheerleading uniform were treated as part of an 
uncopyrightable dress design, the logic behind the separability doctrine would not 
make practical sense and would lead to inconsistent results.
 Although it may have seemed like a win for fashion design protection when the 
Court ruled in favor of Varsity, the consequences of the decision were far from 
groundbreaking. The decision did not expand the scope of copyright protection for 
fashion designs or offer any new protection. Following Star Athletica, fashion 
designers are faced with the same difficulties in securing copyright protection as 
before the decision.
V.  FASHION DESIGNS DO NOT FIT WITHIN THE CURRENT INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME
 The legislature should adopt a form of intellectual property protection that properly 
protects the work of fashion designers. Fashion designs are a form of artistic expression, 
equal to that of music, paintings, and sculptures, which are properly protected through 
copyrights. There are, however, many differences between these other forms of art and 
fashion designs, rendering copyright law ill-suited to protect fashion designs. The 
solution is to forgo copyright protection altogether for fashion designs and to create a 
new regime specifically for fashion.
 A. Fashion Designs are Worthy of Intellectual Property Protection
 Fashion designs are hard to protect because they are part of the inherent usefulness 
of clothing.102 Clothing is inherently functional, as it keeps us warm, clean, and 
protected.103 In other respects, however, clothing is seen as a form of art.104 Many 
proponents of intellectual property protection for fashion designs argue that fashion 
designs are as much a part of artistic culture and expression as other forms of art that are 
granted intellectual property protection.105 Iconic fashion houses such as Carolina 
Herrera, Christian Dior, Cristobal Balenciaga, Emilio Pucci, Hubert de Givenchy, and 
101. See id. (citing Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1974); Peter 
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.)).
102. Patrick J. Concannon, How to Protect Your Fashion Designs, Art L.J. ( July 10, 2017), https://alj.
artrepreneur.com/fashion-design.
103. Can You Copy Clothing Designs?, supra note 98.
104. Berges, supra note 1 (“The art we wear and live with is the art we become. Art—fashion and otherwise—
reflects who we are and who we aspire to be.”).
105. Id.
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Miuccia Prada express their creative genius through fashion, their chosen artistic 
medium.106 Fashion is an expression of creativity that undoubtedly constitutes “art.”107
 Even if, however, one were to concede that the creative elements in fashion designs 
do not equate to the works of Michelangelo,108 Claude Monet,109 Pablo Picasso,110 or 
Jackson Pollock,111 it would still be wrong to argue that fashion designs do not deserve 
intellectual property protection. The Copyright Act only requires “some minimal 
degree of creativity” to qualify for protection.112 While fashion designs undoubtedly 
deserve legal protection, copyright law is not the proper avenue to secure such 
protection.
 B. Copyright Is Not the Proper Form of Protection for Fashion Designs
 First, fashion designers, companies, and advocates have been trying to fit fashion 
designs into the copyright regime for decades, to no avail.113 Although more than 
seventy bills have been considered by Congress since 1914, fashion designs remain 
106. See Carolina Herrera Bids Her Line Adieu With Elegant Flourish, Associated Press (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/ba0f10db4e2a435da781311f44d53e30; Johanna Agerman Ross & Manijeh 
Verghese, The Genius of Christian Dior, Disegno (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.disegnodaily.com/article/
the-genius-of-christian-dior; Chino R. Hernandez, The Mad Genius of Cristóbal Balenciaga, Lifestyle 
Asia (May 4, 2018), https://lifestyleasia.onemega.com/the-mad-genius-of-cristobal-balenciaga; Emilio 
Pucci, Designer-Vintage (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.designer-vintage.com/en/masterclass/article/
emilio-pucci; Emilia Petrarca, Fashion Remembers Hubert de Givenchy’s Genius, The Cut (Mar. 13, 
2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/03/hubert-de-givenchy-obituary-fashion-memories.html; Teo 
van den Broeke, Miuccia Prada to Win Outstanding Achievement Award at the BRAs, GQ (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/gallery/miuccia-prada-wins-outstanding-achievement-award. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art has an exhibit of over thirty-three thousand costumes and accessories on 
display as well as tours that delve into the history of fashion across the globe. See Fashion in Art, The 
Met, https://www.metmuseum.org/events/programs/met-tours/guided-tours/fashion-in-art (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2020); The Costume Institute, The Met, https://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-met/
curatorial-departments/the-costume-institute (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
107. See Berges, supra note 1.
108. Michelangelo, 1475–1564, was an Italian Renaissance sculptor and painter. See Creighton E. Gilbert, 
Michelangelo, Encyclopedia Britannica (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/biography/
Michelangelo.
109. Claude Monet, 1840–1926, was a French painter known primarily for his impressionist style. See 
William C. Seitz, Claude Monet, Encyclopedia Britannica (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.britannica.
com/biography/Claude-Monet.
110. Pablo Picasso, 1881 –1973, was a Spanish artist famously considered to be the founder of Cubism. See 
Marilyn McCully, Pablo Picasso, Encyclopedia Britannica (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.britannica.
com/biography/Pablo-Picasso.
111. Jackson Pollock, 1912–1956, was an American painter recognized for his contributions to the abstract 
expressionist movement. See Francis Valentine O’Connor, Jackson Pollock, Encyclopedia Britannica 
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jackson-Pollock. 
112. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“[T]he requisite level of creativity 
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”).
113. Emma Yao Xiao, The New Trend: Protecting American Fashion Designs Through National Copyright 
Measures, 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 417, 432 (2010).
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generally unprotected through copyright law.114 Under the current Copyright Act, 
courts have attempted to give protection to fashion designs, but the protection is 
inadequate at best.115 When courts grant copyright protection to separable features of 
a useful article, fashion designers still do not get the protection they deserve for the 
design they created.116 For example, the design of an Hermès Birkin Bag, one of the 
most coveted handbags in the world,117 is not copyrightable because the bag is a 
useful article. However, if a print or pattern fabric design were placed on the bag, 
that design could be copyrightable. So even if, in this hypothetical situation, Hermès 
were to win the copyright infringement suit and the infringer could not copy the 
pattern or print on the bag, the design of the bag itself could still be copied. Thus, 
under the current Copyright Act, even when designers win an infringement suit, 
copycats are not completely prohibited from copying their designs.118
 Second, copyright protection is not the appropriate avenue to protect fashion 
designs because of the duration of the copyright protection. For works created after 
January 1, 1978,119 copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus seventy 
years.120 In the fashion world, this is an extremely long time because new designs, 
trends, and fashions are created many times each year.121 The length of time that 
copyright protection lasts is simply unsuitable for the fast paced and ever-changing 
world of fashion. Congress has made clear that useful articles are not subject to 
copyright protection, and that the threshold for copyrighting separable elements of a 
useful article is intended to be high.122 The copyright laws are “a reflection of Congress’ 
desire to protect and encourage artistic creativity, while at the same time ensuring the 
114. Id.
115. See Seth Appel, Copyrights in the Fashion Industry – Tips for Protecting Design, Lexis Prac. Advisor J. 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/copyrights-
in-the-fashion-industry-tips-for-protecting-designs (discussing courts’ difficulties in determining the 
copyrightability of fashion designs).
116. See Julia Brucculieri, How Fast Fashion Brands Get Away with Copying Designers, HuffPost (Sept. 4, 
2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fast-fashion-copycatsn5b8967f9e4b0511db3d7def6.
117. Hermès Birkin, World’s Best, https://www.worldsbest.com/fashion/handbags/hermes/birkin (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020).
118. See Brucculieri, supra note 116.
119. The Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978, and applies to all works created after this date. 
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2020).
120. How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, U.S. Copyright Off., https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/
faq-duration.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). For a work made for hire, a pseudonymous work, or an 
anonymous work, copyright protection lasts for ninety-five years from the date of first publication or 
120 years from the date of creation, whichever is first. Id. 
121. Candice Chua, The Many Fashion Seasons and Fashion Weeks, Explained, Yoyokulala (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://yoyokulala.com/fashion/fashion-week-explained.
122. Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: U.S. Copyright Protection for Applied Art, 
40 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 2 (2016). A “copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention—
conferring only ‘the sole right of multiplying copies.’ Absent copying there can be no infringement of 
copyright.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
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wide availability of useful designs.”123 Allowing useful designs to gain copyright 
protection for long periods of time is exactly what Congress was trying to avoid.124
 Third, given the length of protection and the commonalities between many 
fashion designs, the Copyright Act does not appropriately address the needs of the 
fashion community. Fashion designers commonly gather inspiration from other 
garments.125 Designers find inspiration in nature, culture, architecture, photography, 
music, and through their own life experiences.126 Some of the world’s most influential 
fashion designers have started trends that are still seen on runways today.127 
Intellectual property protection for fashion designs should not hinder the ability to 
rethink old designs or invent new trends by using old ones. 
 Finally, copying may actually stimulate growth and expression in the fashion 
community. Law professors Kal Raustiala128 and Christopher Sprigman129 argue that 
“piracy is paradoxically beneficial to the fashion industry.”130 By quickly mainstreaming 
fashion designs, copied designs lose their appeal and leave consumers with an induced 
desire for new designs, a phenomenon the professors call “induced obsolescence.”131 
This argument supports the idea that copyright law is not the proper form of 
protection for fashion designs, but it does not suggest that fashion designs should be 
excluded from legal protection.
123. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 669 (3rd Cir. 1990).
124. See id.
125. Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2000).
126. Where Do Fashion Designers Find Sources for Inspiration?, Fashion Gone Rouge, https://www.fashion 
gonerogue.com/content/fashion-designers-inspiration (last visited Mar. 3, 2020); Cameron Chapman, 
Finding Inspiration in Uncommon Sources: 12 Places to Look, Smashing Mag. (Feb. 26, 2010) https://
www.smashingmagazine.com/2010/02/finding-inspiration-in-uncommon-sources-12-places-to-look.
127. Bethan Warrior, 7 Designs We Can Thank For Today’s Fashion Trends, Style Mag. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
stylemagazines.com.au/fashion/historic-designers-todays-fashion-trends1/#close. Coco Chanel’s little 
black dress, Louis Réard’s bikini, Dior’s pencil skirt, Givenchy’s shift dress, and Yves Saint Laurent’s 
power suit are just some examples of fashion designs that have been given new inspiration throughout the 
years and have had a timeless impact on the fashion world. Id.
128. Kal Raustiala is a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law. His research 
focuses on international law, international relations, and intellectual property. He earned a B.A. in political 
science from Duke University, a PhD in political science from the University of California San Diego, and 
a J.D. from Harvard Law School. Kal Raustiala Faculty Profile, UCLA L., https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/
faculty-profiles/kal-raustiala/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2020); Kal Raustiala Profile, Princeton U. Program 
in L. & Pub. Aff., https://lapa.princeton.edu/people/kal-raustiala (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
129. Christopher Sprigman is a professor at New York University School of Law. He teaches intellectual 
property law, antitrust law, torts, and comparative constitutional law. He earned a B.A. in history from 
the University of Pennsylvania and a J.D. from the University of Chicago School of Law. Christopher Jon 
Sprigman Profile, N.Y.U. L., http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview 
&personid=37891 (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
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 C. Other Forms of Intellectual Property Are Inadequate for Fashion Designs
 Arguments in favor of denying copyright protection to fashion designs often 
assert that fashion is covered by the more rigorous form of intellectual property 
protection—design patents.132 A design patent protects the ornamental aspects of an 
article.133 There are several reasons why design patents offer inadequate protection 
for fashion designs. Two of the most important have to do with time. Design patents 
are granted for a term of fifteen years.134 During this period, designers have the right 
to exclude others from making or selling their designs.135 Granting protection to a 
useful article for this period of time poses the same issues here as it does with 
copyright law and raises concerns over granting a monopoly to a single design.
Further, design patents take approximately twelve to eighteen months from the date 
of filing to be issued.136 This is problematic in the fashion arena, which evolves and 
reinvents itself at a rapid pace.137 
 Trademarks are another form of intellectual property protection that inadequately 
protect fashion designs. Trademarks protect a brand—a logo, name, or symbol—
used on a good or service.138 While trademarks allow fashion designers to protect the 
name of their brand, trademark law cannot be used to protect an entire article of 
clothing.139 For example, many Louis Vuitton bags have the famous “LV” printed on 
them.140 Although Louis Vuitton’s “LV” is undoubtedly protected through trademark 
law, such protection is generally not sufficient because the actual design of the bag is 
not protected.141 Protecting the logo and design of the bag would be ideal, however, 
132. See Julie Zerbo, Currently Trending in Fashion: Design Patents, Fashion L. (June 23, 2016), http://www.
thefashionlaw.com/home/currently-trending-in-fashion-design-patents.
133. Gene Quinn, Design Patents: The Under Utilized and Overlooked Patent, IP Watchdog (Sept. 10, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/10/design-patents/id=72714.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2020) (“Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of 15 years from the date of 
grant.”). Design patents granted from applications filed before May 13, 2015 have a fourteen year term 
from the date of grant. 1505 Term of Design Patent [R-08.2017], U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1505.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
135. Campbell, supra note 11.
136. Nicholas Wells, Design Patent Protection in the United States, Nicholas Wells IP L., https://www.
wellsiplaw.com/design-patent-protection-in-the-united-states (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
137. See Sanford Stein, How Could Changing Consumer Trends Affect Fast-Fashion Leaders H&M And Zara?, 
Forbes (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sanfordstein/2019/02/10/how-could-changing-
consumer-trends-affect-fast-fashion-leaders-hm-and-zara/#1f4792c16f48 (noting that fashion trends 
are changing from a “top-down fashion evolution, dictated by manufacturers and fashion periodicals, to 
a bottom-up percolation, driven by social media and personal expression”).
138. Protecting Your Trademark, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. 2 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf.
139. See id. at 1.
140. See Louis Vuitton, https://us.louisvuitton.com/eng-us/homepage (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
141. LV Trademark Details, Justia Trademarks, https://trademarks.justia.com/713/13/lv-71313983.html 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
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coupling trademark protections with design patents is also deficient—per the reasons 
discussed above.142
 Trade dress is a form of trademark protection that has enabled designers to gain 
additional protection on aspects such as color, packaging, or a product itself.143 Two 
of the most famous designs that have been granted trade dress protection are 
Christian Louboutin’s red sole144 and Tiffany’s blue box—which includes its color, 
packaging, and even the white satin ribbon.145 Christian Louboutin and Tiffany have 
both acquired secondary meaning146 and are two of the most recognizable trademarks 
in the industry.147 Trade dress, however, is inappropriate for most fashion designs 
because it requires secondary meaning before it can be granted which, in turn, 
requires brand recognition of the article seeking trade dress.148
VI.  CONCLUSION
 Despite the popular view to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s holding in Star 
Athletica did not broaden the scope of copyright protection in the fashion world. 
Although the Court set out a test for copyright eligibility, this test is far from clear 
and can still lead to different interpretations regarding its application. Further, the 
holding in Star Athletica leaves open the question of whether the scope of copyright 
protection should be broadened to include fashion designs. For decades, fashion 
designers and companies have been unsuccessful in their attempts to fit fashion 
designs into the current copyright regime, which offers them inadequate protection, 
at best.
 Fashion designs are a form of artistic expression undoubtedly deserving of 
intellectual property protection. There are, however, many factors that make copyright 
law the wrong form of legal protection for them. Since fashion designs do not fit 
142. This Note does not discuss counterfeiters and the causes of action fashion designers have against them. 
143. Campbell, supra note 11.
144. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that “Louboutin’s trademark, which covers the red, lacquered outsole of a woman’s high 
fashion shoe, has acquired limited ‘secondary meaning’ as a distinctive symbol that identifies the 
Louboutin brand”).
145. Robert Klara, How Tiffany’s Iconic Blue Box Became the World’s Most Popular Package, AdWeek (Sept. 22, 
2014), https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/how-tiffany-s-iconic-box-became-world-s-most-
popular-package-160228.
146. What is Trade Dress?, Gabor & Marotta LLC, https://www.marottalaw.com/Articles/What-is-Trade-
Dress.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (“Secondary meaning is when the public associates a trademark or 
trade dress with a source or producer of goods or services, rather than just the product itself. If trade dress 
is well known and identifies a specific company to the public . . . it can be protectable.”).
147. Julie Zerbo, How Difficult is it to Claim a Color as Your Own?, Fashion L. (June 18, 2018), http://www.
thefashionlaw.com/home/how-difficult-is-it-to-claim-a-color-as-your-own (explaining that the colors 
trademarked by Christian Louboutin and Tiffany are recognized as some of the most famous trademarks 
in the world).
148. See What is Trade Dress?, supra note 146 (“To be protectable, trade dress must be distinctive or have 
acquired secondary meaning.”).
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neatly into the Copyright Act, they should not be forced into a regime that does not 
properly protect them. Instead, the legislature should create a new form of protection 
specifically for fashion designs and the use of those designs in the fashion industry.
